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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 14-3356 
_______________ 
 
MARY K. PRIMROSE, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
TRENT MELLOT; 
TOWNSHIP OF UPPER ALLEN 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-11-cv-00835) 
District Judge: Hon. Yvette Kane 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 21, 2015 
 
BEFORE: FISHER, CHAGARES and COWEN,  Circuit Judges 
 
 (Filed May 1, 2015) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION* 
_______________ 
 
 
______________  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Mary Primrose (“Appellant”) appeals the District Court’s order overruling her 
objections to a bill of costs and affirming the cost of $2,061.25 taxed by the Clerk of 
Court.  For the reasons detailed below, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Because we write solely for the parties, we will only set forth the facts necessary to 
inform our analysis.  Appellant filed suit in federal court against Trent Mellot 
(“Appellee”) and the Township of Upper Allen, alleging violations of her federal 
constitutional rights and a state law claim of false arrest.  The parties filed cross-motions 
for summary judgment.  Appellant’s motion was denied, while Appellee’s motion was 
granted in part only.  A jury returned a verdict for the defendants on the remaining claims 
and a judgment in favor of them was entered the same day.  We affirmed that judgment.  
Appellee then sought an award of costs in the amount of $3,933.29.  Appellant objected, 
arguing that she is indigent and that certain items listed in Appellee’s bill of costs are not 
properly taxable.  The Clerk of Court agreed with Appellant in part and reduced the 
award to Appellee to $2,061.25.  Appellant then filed objections with the District Court, 
which it overruled and affirmed the taxation of costs.  The current appeal followed. 
II. 
 Given the District Court's discretionary equitable power to award costs under Rule 
54(d)(1), taxation of costs is reviewed only for an “abuse of discretion.” In re Paoli R.R. 
Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d 449, 458 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).  We note that Rule 
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54(d)(1) “creates the ‘strong presumption’ that costs are to be awarded to the prevailing 
party.”  Id. at 462 (citation omitted).   
 Appellant argues that the District Court abused its discretion in taxing costs against 
her because she is indigent and unable to pay.  But we have held that even if a losing 
party is indigent or unable to pay the full measure of costs, a district court is not required 
to automatically reduce costs.  Id. at 464.  Here, the District Court considered the fact that 
Appellant’s monthly income is $883.00 per month, that she cannot work, and that she 
receives rent subsidy payments for housing.  It then reviewed cases in which courts have 
reduced or vacated costs and concluded that reductions were typically made in cases 
involving greater financial burdens than those presented here.  Although the District 
Court noted Appellant’s limited monthly income, it again determined that, because the 
costs placed on her were less onerous than in cases where reductions were allowed, the 
costs were reasonable.  Under these circumstances, and in light of the analysis conducted 
by the District Court, we cannot conclude that its decision to tax $2,061.25 in costs to 
Appellant constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
 The cases relied on by Appellant do not convince us otherwise, as in those cases 
too, the court declined to award costs to the prevailing party in instances involving greater 
financial burdens than those suffered by Appellant here.  See Yudenko v. Guarinni, No. 
06-cv-4161, 2010 WL 2490679, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 2010) (refusing to require 
plaintiff to pay costs when he had no income, was disabled, did not receive government 
assistance or benefits, had no assets, and owed a debt to Lancaster County in the amount 
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of $20,000); Lindsey v. Vaughn, No. Civ. A. 93-2030, 2001 WL 1132409, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 
Sept. 24, 2001) (refusing to require plaintiffs to pay costs when one earned only $15 a 
month and the others earned only approximately $30 per month, with no other sources of 
income).  To be sure, we make no determination as to whether the District Court, in light 
of Appellant’s limited income, could have decided that a decrease in the award of costs 
would have been appropriate.  We merely conclude that its refusal to do so does not 
constitute an abuse of discretion.   
 Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion by taxing as costs to Appellant 
certain deposition transcripts and witness fees.  Although Appellant concedes that 
discovery depositions are taxable, she nonetheless argues that the deposition costs should 
be excluded because they were not necessary.  However, as Appellee points out in his 
brief, the depositions at issue were both cited and used in his motion for summary 
judgment.  Accordingly, the decision to include their cost in the award to Appellee was 
not erroneous.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1920.   
III. 
 In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the District Court entered on June 18, 
2014, will be affirmed. 
